Quantitative Easing isn’t working

There is an economic crisis, yet those who advocate quantitative easing as a solution have misunderstood both the nature and the magnitude of it. This blog has consistently criticised Osborne's austerity programme and his evidence free belief that the public sector has been ‘crowding out’ the private sector.

Now I want to look at the Bank of England’s monetary policy: quantitative easing.

Quantitative easing (QE) is often referred to as ‘printing money’. In fact it is more accurately described as giving banks cheap credit (see BBC guide to QE). The use of QE is based on the assumption that our economic system is in crisis due to a lack of available credit (a credit crunch) and a lack of lending.

The same intellectual malaise is evident in the ‘soft Keynesians’ who advocated bailing out the banking system, but now reject an economic stimulus. Their unspoken slogan is ‘save the banks, fuck the people’.

These people failed to foresee the crisis, and now fail to offer viable solutions for resolving it – in fact (if one assumes their policies are advocated rationally) they seek to make it permanent by institutionalising declining real pay and hoping the private sector will magic some jobs soon (crowding out theory)

There are several collective nouns for this group: Chancellors, Treasury ministers, leading economists or business leaders.

Today the economy does not suffer from a lack of credit. It suffers from a lack of demand. Unemployment, underemployment and wage constraint have all produced a situation in which living standards are falling.

Separately, the government has massively cut its capital spending, sucking further billions out of the economy.

Vincent Cable whinges that the banks are not lending to small businesses yet why would they in a climate of falling demand, and wider financial uncertainty? Regular pay is increasing at only 1.1% per year, outstripped by inflation at over three times the rate. It is no surprise that retail sales volumes fell 0.8% in February 2012 (incorporating a 1.5% decline for non-food items).

Some, to make the case that QE is necessary, have pointed to statistics showing that the number of small business loans rejected by the banks has quadrupled since the crisis. This ignores two very salient factors:

1. Businesses are now making more loan applications to cover (what they hope are temporary) shortfalls, rather than to invest
2. Banks, whose reckless lending practices played a major role in causing the crisis, are now more rightly more cautious
3. The same business plan in 2006/07 at a time of high employment and rising real wages was a lot more attractive to invest in than it is in 2012/13

The real need for the UK economy is not more credit, but more demand –and that means putting more not less money in people’s pockets. It would mean doing the exact opposite of what George Osborne is doing – redistributing £30bn from benefits and tax credits into the pockets of businesses via tax breaks. It would mean ending pay constraint and reversing the VAT hike (a tax on consumption). This could be funded by reinstituting the 50% rate and closing down on the loopholes used by the super-rich and big business to avoid their obligations.

Meanwhile the Bank of England’s now £325bn quantitative easing programme has clearly not been used to extend credit to meet any growing demand. Instead, the banks have used the extra liquidity to speculate in derivatives markets and to invest in safer foreign markets.

This is not to say quantitative easing is always a bad policy. It’s not, but in the current climate it has long outlived its utility. Part of the problem is the limited policy options open to the outsourced (independent) Bank of England and the lack of any coherent strategy from HM Treasury.

Instead of botched austerity, we need investment based around a new industrial policy to create jobs in sectors that meet people’s urgent needs, including housing, energy, and transport.

The real Keynes

Book Review by Graham Turner

Keynes Betrayed, by Geoff Tily, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

Palgrave Macmillan have republished Geoff Tily’s “Keynes Betrayed” in paperback.

This is an important book because it contradicts so much of the perceived wisdom over Keynes’s policy prescription. And it should be stressed, the errors of understanding Keynes are committed by economists on both sides of the spectrum – right and left – as well as a good chunk of those sitting in the middle.

Keynes was far more concerned about monetary issues than fiscal policy. Unfortunately, most cursory reading of Keynes simply focuses on the General Theory, which was written in 1936. Even then, too many readers of this important book fail to appreciate the chronology of policy advice Keynes was offering in the 1930s – monetary first, fiscal second.

Indeed, Keynes made an enormous – and positive contribution – to policy long before the General Theory was published, as Geoff Tily shows commendably in this book. "Keynes's central policy priority was a permanently reduced long-term rate of interest", Tily argues. Keynes was a leading proponent of central bank long-term asset purchases – today called quantitative easing (QE). Furthermore, he was quite clear about the problem within bond markets which made QE necessary, as shown by his liquidity preference theory. Keynes also understood the importance of targeting the yield rather than merely setting a nominal purchase target for QE.


In all these respects, Keynes had a much greater understanding of the bond market – including the critical role of expectations - than today’s central bankers. The current FOMC has been content to announce an extension of its own, somewhat flawed QE, announcing last November that it would buy a further US$600bn of US Treasuries. Since then, sniping from hawks on the FOMC, a (modest) uptick in economic growth and an unseemly rush to extend tax cuts has sparked a huge sell-off in US Treasuries. And that has occurred just as the S&P/Case Shiller index for house prices is poised to break down to new bear market lows. Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke has been forced to admit that the economic recovery in the US is slow. It may well stall, precisely because the Fed chair, and much of the economic establishment, including New York Times commentator Paul Krugman (not to mention the departed, discredited Lawrence Summers and Chrisina Romer) simply do not ‘get Keynes’.

One economist who clearly does is Geoff Tily. His book is based on a PhD thesis, supervised by Professor Victoria Chick at the University College of London. Professor Chick is one of a handful of economists who truly comprehends the importance of monetary affairs in Keynes’s work, and encouraged Geoff to write his thesis.

Geoff provides clear evidence of the role Keynes played in driving the shift towards QE in the early 1930s, long before the General Theory was published. He also dissects the manner in which Keynes’s legacy was traduced by economists, both on the right and soft left in the post-war era, after his untimely death in 1946.

This book is rigorous, and readers will be impressed by the comprehensive manner in which Geoff takes Keynes’s critics to task. It is not the sort of book that can be read in one quick swoop. It is a demanding read, because it is so thorough. It challenges many of the misconceptions over the policies pursued during the 1930s. For these reasons, this book helps to explain why the West has botched its response to the credit crunch.