Democratise companies to rein in excessive banker bonuses

Prem Sikka

In times of austerity, one of few things that seems to be booming is the trade in wheelbarrows. At least, company directors at major corporations will need them to collect vast amounts of remuneration they continue to award themselves, with the help of ineffective remuneration committees.

The financial dealers on Wall Street have collected about US$26.7 billion in bonus payments, the equivalent of a year’s pay for the 1.1m workers on the minimum wage. The UK is not far behind. Bonuses in the City of London have increased by 49% compared to 2012, a higher figure than for Wall Street.

The chief executive of the crisis-ridden Cooperative Bank, Euan Sutherland, was to receive a remuneration package of £3.5 million, but has since resigned. The state-owned Royal Bank of Scotland declared a loss of about £8 billion, but has given 11 directors a bonus package worth about £18.25m between them. At Barclays and Lloyds Bank, the chief executives could be collecting more than £7m each. Of course, wheelbarrows come in handy at other corporate boardrooms too. Despite the costs arising from the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the pay packet of the BP chief executive has tripled to US$8.7m (£5.2m).

The corporate boardrooms are addicted to bonuses, but are the bonuses justified? The claims for bonuses and excessive rewards presuppose that executives exert superhuman efforts to generate wealth. The anatomy of corporate decisions does not really support that. When a new executive arrives at an organisation, for some time s/he is likely to be managing and living off products, services and strategies already in place. So the claims of distinctive contribution are hard to sustain.

Now suppose an executive decides to launch a new product or a project; this will always take some time to develop, plan and launch. The same applies if the mission is to rescue an ailing business. The success or failure of the new projects will not be known for many months or years. Meanwhile, the company will probably incur upfront costs, with no guarantee that the outlays will be recouped. Even after the initial celebrations, the product/service may turn out to be a failure and become a costly burden, as evidenced by payment protection insurance and other financial scandals.

Even if new ventures are successful, the success will depend on the involvement of other employees. It is hard to relate the success of anything to the efforts of few superstar executives. If the success cannot easily be related to the input of one person then the idea of performance-related pay becomes highly problematic. This suggests that higher rewards are claimed simply because some individuals or groups have sufficient power and control to give themselves disproportionate rewards.

So the question then is how to control the institutionalised fat-cattery. The UK government’s preferred solution is to empower shareholders by giving them a binding vote on executive remuneration. Such a step assumes that shareholders are owners of companies and bear most of the risks, and will somehow act in the interests of broader society. The evidence for this is not persuasive.

Shareholders in UK banks have average shareholding duration of about three months. Their position is no different from that of a speculator or a trader seeking short-term gains. They don’t have strong incentives to constrain directors. The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards looked at the operations of HBOS and concluded that shareholders did not exert “the effective pressure that might have acted as a constraint upon the flawed strategy of the bank”.

The commission also noted that “shareholders failed to control risk-taking in banks, and indeed were criticising some for excessive conservatism”. Shareholders often profit from harmful practices without any personal responsibility. A company can be mandated to sell harmful products, for example, cigarettes. Shareholders can share the resulting profits, but are not personally liable for because they are shielded by the doctrine of limited liability. Thus shareholder irresponsibility is written into the system and they don’t have strong incentives to consider the social good.

Besides, shareholders don’t provide most of the risk capital either. At major UK banks, shareholders only provide between 4.22% and 7.24% of total capital. The rest is provided by savers and creditors. Therefore, it is hard to make a good case for shareholder supremacy.

The proper approach is to empower the public. In the case of banks; employees, savers and borrowers are a good proxy for the public at large. They should appoint directors and vote on their remuneration. Elsewhere, employees, consumers and suppliers could be mobilised to invigilate directors as they all have a long-term interest in the welfare of the company. In a democratised company, directors are unlikely to get high remuneration without paying attention to the interests of employees and other stakeholders.

• This article first appeared on The Conversation website

The Banking Reform Act is rearranging the deck chairs on the neoliberal Titanic

 
Prem Sikka

A new report from the Centre for Labour and Social Studies highlights the failure of the Banking Reform Act to deal with any of the problems at the core of the 2007/8 collapse. Here, its author explains what's really going on.

Some six years after the banking crash, the UK has wheeled out its answer – the Banking Reform Act. Some deckchairs have been rearranged, but little attention has been paid to the key drivers of the crisis.

The biggest financial crisis has coincided with the rise of neoliberalism, which emphasised faith in free markets and light-touch regulation. The notion of competition is a key concept and is applied to every sector of society, including corporations, regions, government departments, hospitals, and universities because this somehow secures efficient allocation of resources and opens the door to wealth and riches. Neoliberalism provides everyday understandings of what it means to be successful. It reconstructs individuals as competitive beings engaged in the endless pursuit of private wealth and consumption. In common with other sectors of society, individuals are expected to have strategies for meeting performance targets and be rewarded accordingly. Thus, performance related pay for executives has become endemic. A necessary condition for the operation of markets and pursuit of self-interest is that all individuals, including business enterprises, need to be constrained by social norms and regulatory structures. But this has not been high on the neoliberal agenda because the state is bad and inefficient and has to be rolled-back, and the self-correcting markets would restore some mythical equilibrium. Well, it has not turned out that way.

The fault lines of neoliberalism have long been evident. The mid-1970s secondary banking crash highlighted empires built on fraud. The state dutifully bailed out banks, property and insurance companies. In 1984, Johnson Matthey Bank collapsed under the weight of fraud and the Bank of England organised a rescue. In 1995, Barings Bank collapsed due to fraud. The twentieth century’s biggest banking frauds took place at the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). In July 1991, the Bank of England closed BCCI. Some 1.4 million depositors lost some part of their savings. In an environment of weak regulation, banks continued to pick customers’ pockets by selling useless, pensions, mortgages and saving schemes.

Neoliberalism, remained the key philosophy for governments. The 2008 banking crash showed that banks made vast amount of money from running illegal cartels, money laundering, insider trading, tax dodges, manipulation of interest rates, selling abusive products, misleading investors and consumers. Markets celebrated higher corporate profits and did not ask any questions about the quality of profits, or the social consequences of banking practices. Bank executives collected vast sums of money from performance related contracts.

Markets did not come forward to rescue banks. It was the state, which has been restructured rather than rolled-back, which bailed out banks. Under the weight of neoliberal ideologies it is now less concerned about the redistribution of income and wealth, labour rights, or the provision of decent healthcare, education, pensions and social infrastructure. It has shunned any attempt to democratise corporations or enhance their public accountability. Its major purpose is now to guarantee corporate profits and socialise losses, a kind of reverse socialism has been institutionalised.

The UK state has committed some £976 billion of loans and guarantees support distressed banks and also handed over another £375 billion under its quantitative easing programme. During the boom years of 2002 to 2007, the financial sector paid £203 billion in UK corporation tax, national insurance, VAT, payroll taxes, stamp duty and insurance taxes. Between 1991 and 2007, it created around 35,000 additional jobs. But it received vast stacks of money in return. Confidence in the banking sector is maintained through the provision of a taxpayer funded depositor protection scheme which safeguards savings of individuals of up to £85,000. Since March 2009, the state has maintained interest rates at 0.5%, considerably below the rate of inflation. This has robbed pensioners and savers of income and also eroded the real value of savings. The policy has enabled banks to borrow at ultra-cheap rates, lend at high rates, make profits and replenish their balance sheets. The customer base for banks has swelled as the government has persuaded pensioners and social security claimants to receive their payments through bank accounts rather than through the Post Office. The Private Finance Initiative has been a bonanza for banks and other corporations. In 2012, there were over 700 contracts with a capital value of £54.7 billion. The government is committed to repaying£301 billion over the next 25-30 years, a profit of nearly £247 billion.

The Banking Reform Act does not check fat-cattery or speculative practices. The sunlight of democracy and public accountability is an effective antidote to shady practices, but is missing from the Act as it does not connect with neoliberal values. The Act should have separated speculative banking from the rest. To prevent speculators from contaminating the economy, the privilege of limited liability should have been withdrawn from all gambling. Instead of banking elites regulating the banks for the benefit of the industry a Board of Stakeholders, representing a plurality of interests, should have been created to guide the regulator. This Board should not be dominated by the finance industry. In fact, only a minority should come from the industry, thus ensuring that other voices are heard and policies are made by consensus. Its meetings would be held in the open and its minutes and working papers would be publicly available.

Employees, savers and borrowers have long-term interests and should elect directors and vote on their remuneration. Instead, the government is obsessed with shareholders who are often the source of problems. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standardsconcluded that “shareholders failed to control risk-taking in banks, and indeed were criticising some for excessive conservatism”. The typical shareholdingperiod in banks is about three months. Shareholders provide only a small amount of risk capital at banks. For example, at Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland and Standard Chartered, shareholders provide about 5%, 7%, 5%, 5.5% and 7.25% respectively of total capital. Shareholders are akin to traders and speculators and cannot invigilate bank directors.

In time, the missed opportunities for opening a new chapter in banking regulation will haunt the UK.

• This article first appeared on Open Democracy.

Hamstrung SFO not capable of holding bankers to account

Prem Sikka

Iceland has sent four former directors of its bank Kaupthing to prison for fraud. But the chances of similar legal action happening in the UK are low, where fraud investigators have a poor record.

The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is the main agency for investigating and prosecuting major fraud. It was formed in 1988 after a spate of high-profile cases. A government-sponsored inquiry into share price rigging at Guinness in the 1980s concluded that too many executives at major corporations had a “cynical disregard of laws and regulations … cavalier misuse of company monies … contempt for truth and common honesty. All these in a part of the City which was thought respectable”.

But rather than changing corporate laws, amending personal liability of directors, or creating an effective enforcement agency, the government created the SFO.

Last week, the SFO’s case against businessman Victor Dahdaleh collapsed because at the last minute it could not provide evidence of alleged graft. This is not the only case the SFO has botched. It spent between £25-40m investigating price-fixing by pharmaceutical companies supplying the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), but the case collapsed because of errors in the interpretation of law.

Previously, the SFO was very slow in taking action against BAE Systems over allegations of corrupt practice. The SFO mislaid 32,000 documents relating to the case. It is currently facing a lawsuit for damages from the Tchenguiz brothers after dropping a three-year investigation into the collapse of Icelandic bank Kaupthing.

Bigger beasts

In 2012-13, the SFO brought 12 cases covering 20 individuals, eventually securing 14 convictions and recovering £11.4m from fraudsters. But it rarely went after the bigger beasts. Money laundering and sanctions busting by British banks did not appear on its radar. The SFO has hardly been visible in investigating and prosecuting the misdemeanours of bankers who brought the UK economy close to collapse.

In mitigation, it might be argued that the SFO’s failures are the outcome of the politics of government cuts. In 2008-09, the SFO had an investigations and prosecutions budget of £52m. Despite the banking crash, LIBOR rigging and other scandals, the UK government has drastically reduced SFO’s resources.

For 2013-14 its budget is £30m and will decline to £28.8 million for 2014-15. That is a cut of over 44% since the start of the global financial crisis.

Faced with a reduced budget and pay freezes, the SFO has been losing experienced staff and outsourcing a lot of its legal work, often paying very high fees. Such practices make it difficult to build in-house expertise and an institutional memory.

Other countries seem to assign higher priority to fraud investigation. The US equivalent, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has an annual budget of US$1.674 billion (about £1.1 billion). It is therefore in a far stronger position to take on the bigger beasts. The SEC has its shortcomings, but it is more likely to get a result than the SFO.

Ineffective patchwork

The SFO’s failures are indicative of Britain’s failure to build durable and effective institutional structures to fight financial crime. Rather than a single powerful and well resourced agency, there is an ineffective patchwork of institutions.

These include the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), The National Crime Agency (NCA) Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Crown Prosecution Service, the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting Council, to name just a few. The overlapping and often unclear boundaries result in duplication, waste, obfuscation, delays, poor accountability and outright failures.

Any effective fight against globalised financial crime needs to streamline its institutional structures. In the age of globalisation the UK cannot fight financial crime on a shoestring, with puny organisations. Large parts of the patchwork should be replaced by a UK equivalent of the SEC.

But a new organisation would not be able to combat wealthy elites or giant corporations without significant resources. This might be expensive, but it is an investment that would pay off.

• This article originally appeared on The Conversation website

Tax Justice - Are you serious?

An event jointly organised by Action Aid, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Tax Justice Network, War on Want. 

Monday, 25 November 2013 from 10:30 to 17:00 
London, United Kingdom
Get tickets / register online

With a great line up of speakers and panellists this promises to be a day that will make you think seriously about tax justice.

Speakers and panellists include:

Margaret Hodge MP - Chair of the UK Public Accounts Committee
Richard Brooks - Private Eye,
Andrew Masiye - Activista Zambia,
John Christensen - Tax Justice Network,
Alex Cobham - Centre for Global Development,
Rosa Curling - Leigh Day,
Tim Dixon - Purpose,
Martin Drewry - Health Poverty Action,
Rich Hawkins - PIRC,
John Hilary - War on Want,
David Hillman - Robin Hood Tax Campaign,
Polly Jones - World Development Movement,
Government of Jersey representative,
David McNair - Save the Children,
Richard Murphy - Tax Research UK,
Louise Rouse - Share Action,
Professor Prem Sikka - University of Essex,
Michelle Stanistreet - National Union of Journalists


This past year has seen a momentous shift in public and political perception of the issue of tax fairness.

Tax, who pays it and who doesn’t, has come to be the social and economic issue of the moment. And with good reason. Tax dodging is now a scandal in the minds of the public and politicians alike:

"Individuals and businesses must pay their fair share" David Cameron in his speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos in January this year.

Having already had huge tranches of public money shifted from public goods and services to bail out banks guilty of reckless lending; people have witnessed exposé after exposé of large multinationals and wealthy individuals refusing to pay back into the common weal and scorning their basic civic duty to pay a fair share of tax. People across the globe find themselves trapped in poverty while rich multinationals and individuals get away with not paying what they owe.

People are angry - it’s time to build on this anger. 

In the past month a number of organisations and individuals have been discussing how we can convert the peaks of media and public outrage at tax avoidance into a strong, grassroots and citizen-led movement call for tax justice that this and future Governments cannot ignore.

This event is an opportunity to join with other organisations, activists and thinkers, to hear from tax justice pioneers and critics, and to ask the hard questions and debate the tough issues.
Join us for the Tax dodging ‘Tax Justice – Are you serious?’ forum.

If you intend to join us for the UK Gold screening & panel discussion at 6.30 please do confirm your tickets for the film here.


See also:

• Tax justice - exposing the multi-billion fraud 
• Tax justice becomes a movement
• Mervyn King backs the tax justice campaign?
• 5 reasons why you can't take the government seriously on tax justice 

Read a report of the conference here (via In particular order)

Google and ExxonMobil run rings around outdated tax laws

Prem Sikka

Tax avoidance shows no sign of abating. Google, the company with the slogan “Don’t be evil", is at it again. The company has been named and shamed by the UK House of Commons' Public Accounts Committee, but that has not persuaded directors to change their ways.

According to information filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Google group of companies generated global revenues of US$50.175 billion last year. Some US$4.872 billion (nearly £3.25 billion) of revenues came from the UK.

Google explains these revenues are “based on the billing addresses of our customers for the Google segment and the ship-to-addresses of our customers for the Mobile segment”. But this does not mean the revenues are necessarily booked in the UK, which acts as a marketing mechanism for its Ireland operations. As the Public Accounts Committee heard, through careful attention to detail, a large part of the revenues is booked in Ireland.

Despite the US data, Google’s UK operations reported a revenues of just £506m in 2012, some way short of the figure reported to the SEC. This gave rise to a UK profit of £36.2 million and a corporate tax bill of £11.2 million.

Google’s Irish arm reported revenues of €15.5 billion (£13 billion), of which €11 billion is wiped out by “administrative expenses”. The Irish operations reported a profit of €154m (£131m) in 2012, but paid just €17m (£14.5m) in tax.

Google uses complex corporate structures. Royalty payments, masquerading as administrative expenses, are a key part of the profit shifting strategies. For example, its intellectual property is held in Bermuda, which does not levy corporate taxes. Various subsidiaries pay royalty fees which result in tax deductible expenses in Ireland and elsewhere, but tax-free income in Bermuda.

Google’s SEC filing shows the company had foreign income before taxes of just over US$8 billion for 2012. Most of the income from foreign operations was recorded by an Irish subsidiary. The foreign tax paid/payable was US$358m, equivalent to a rate of 4.43%. The accounts received the customary clean bill of health from auditors Ernst & Young.

Another company using complex corporate structures and intergroup transactions to avoid taxes is ExxonMobil. Its Spanish subsidiary operated for a while from the same address as its auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Spanish company apparently had one employee on an annual salary of €55,000, but it reported net profits of €9.9 billion for the period 2009 to 2011. The key to this was a strategy designed to take advantage of Spanish laws for attracting foreign investment. The company shuffled the payment of dividends and avoided taxes in the US elsewhere.

We can all ask companies to honour their promises of ethical and responsible conduct, but such calls have little effect. All over the world tax authorities are overwhelmed by the tide of avoidance and lack the financial and political resources to investigate giant corporations.

Yes, they can be more aggressive and governments can move to deprive tax dodging companies of any public contracts. But such efforts need to be accompanied by a fundamental reform of the way corporate profits are taxed. The current system is over a hundred years old and is fundamentally flawed.

For example, Google, ExxonMobil and other companies may have hundreds of subsidiaries, but they are unified entities with a common board of directors, common share ownership and a common strategy that directs their operations. The companies publish consolidated financial statements for the group as a whole, which recognise that transactions within the group of companies, do not add any economic value. These transactions have zero effect on their consolidated profits.

Yet the tax treatment is entirely different. For tax purposes Google and ExxonMobil are not treated as a single entity. Instead they are treated as hundreds of separate entities. This encourages them to play royalty and other games and shift profits through artificial transactions and arbitrage the global tax systems.

So the obvious solution is to treat multinational corporations as single unified entities. Their global profit, with some modifications, needs to be allocated to various countries on the basis of employee, sales, assets or other key determinants of profits and taxed at the appropriate rates.

Such a system already operates within some federal states, most notably the United States, Canada, Switzerland and Argentina. It prevents companies from artificially locating domestic profits to internal tax havens. Thus, a company trading in California cannot easily avoid taxes on its local profits by claiming that it is a located in Delaware, which offers minimal taxes on varieties of corporate income.

The above reforms do not necessarily need international agreement and can be implemented unilaterally by any government. It has considerable similarities with the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposed by the European Union.

The EU’s plan could make a serious dent in tax avoidance, but is opposed by the corporate dominated Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD). The OECD’s preference is to tweak the current system, which cannot address the fault lines.

Without a fundamental reform companies like Google and ExxonMobil will continue to deprive national governments of much needed revenues.

• This article first appeared on The Conversation website.

Barclays and KPMG involved in $660m tax ‘sham structure’

Prem Sikka

What are the chances that in the face of public criticisms, big business would curb its tax avoidance practices? Well, not much, as evidenced by a case decided by the US Court of Federal Claims.
Salem Financial Inc v United States relates to a complex financial transactions known as STARS (Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities). The case involved Salem Inc, a subsidiary of North Carolina based bank, BB&T.

The scheme was designed by Barclays Bank, a major UK financial institution; KPMG, one of the world’s biggest accountancy firms; and Sidley Austin, a US law firm. At the centre of the dispute is a tax liability of some US$660m.

Through collaboration with Barclays, KPMG specialised in developing transactions that took advantage of differences between international tax systems. Barclays marketed some versions of STARS to a number of corporations, including AIG, Microsoft, Intel, and Prudential. KPMG introduced the STARS transaction to BB&T at a January 17, 2002 meeting and used a slide show to outline the steps necessary for the scheme to work. KPMG had little prior business relationship with BB&T.

Contrived transactions

The key idea of the tax avoidance scheme was to generate large-scale foreign tax credits which could in turn be used to enhance revenue and reduce taxes payable by BB&T in the US. A series of transactions with circular cash flows were designed to create the tax savings.

The court noted that in essence the scheme called for BB&T to establish a trust containing approximately US$6 billion in revenue-producing bank assets. The monthly revenue from the trust was then cycled through a UK trustee, an act that served as a basis for UK taxation. Although the revenue was immediately returned to BB&T’s trust, the assessment of UK taxes generated tax credits that were shared 50/50 between Barclays and BB&T.

A US$1.5 billion loan from Barclays to BB&T was also part of the structured transaction, although the loan was not necessary to the objective of generating foreign tax credits. The Barclays monthly payment to BB&T represented BB&T’s share of the tax credits, and had the effect of reducing the interest cost of BB&T’s loan.

The main question for the 21-day court hearing was whether the STARS transaction had any purpose other than to generate tax savings, and if not, whether penalties should be assessed against BB&T. The 67-page court judgment found in favour of the government and the company has been ordered to pay US$680 million plus penalties of US$112 million.

After examining some 1,250 exhibits the judge referred to the scheme as “an abusive tax avoidance scheme” and said that the “conduct of those persons from BB&T, Barclays, KPMG, and the Sidley Austin law firm who were involved in this and other transactions was nothing short of reprehensible”.

The judge went on: “The professionals involved should have known better than to follow the STARS path, rife with its conflicts of interest, questionable pro forma legal and accounting opinions, and a taxpayer with a seemingly insatiable appetite for tax avoidance”. The whole STARS set-up was described as “a sham structure”.

Controversial pasts

Barclays and KPMG are no strangers to tax avoidance controversies. After lengthy investigations by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and action by the US Department of Justice, KPMG were fined US$456 million for “criminal wrongdoing” in tax matters and a number of its former personnel were also given prison sentences. The firm has also been the subject of investigation of the UK House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, but this has not dulled its appetite for profits through the sale of tax avoidance schemes.

Barclays relies upon taxpayer guarantees for its core business, but operates a very lucrative tax avoidance business which is estimated to have generated around a billion pounds in fees each year between 2007 and 2010. Last year the UK government had to introduce emergency legislation to negate two avoidance schemes used by Barclays for its own business which could have deprived the UK Treasury of around £500 million. Despite fines and prison sentences major businesses remain addicted to tax avoidance. Public opprobrium has become just another cost of doing business.

It is time to shut down businesses who routinely pick citizens’ pockets through tax avoidance. Their schemes are undermining revenues that are much needed to revive the economy and provide education, healthcare, pensions, security and other public goods that distinguish civilised societies from the rest.

Yet the UK government continues to shower gifts on tax avoiders, KPMG continues to receive public contracts and Barclays is propped up by taxpayer-funded guarantees and loans. Only this week Ed Miliband hired KPMG’s deputy chairman for advice on low pay. Rather than giving them another consultancy job, politicians should be asking KPMG to explain the firm’s role in the erosion of social fabric.


This article first appeared on The Conversation website

Big business is policing tax avoidance – what could possibly go wrong?

David Heaton's resignation from an advisory panel on tax abuse exposes the perils of hiving off tax avoidance enforcement

Prem Sikka

The privatisation of Royal Mail is making headlines, but another form of privatisation is attracting less attention – of UK law enforcement in vital areas, such as organised tax avoidance. Now it is business interests that decide whether Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) can go after those involved in abusive tax avoidance schemes, and this includes those who are close to the tax avoidance industry.

The flaws in the privatisation of law enforcement have been highlighted by the resignation of David Heaton from the government's flagship general anti-abuse rule (Gaar) panel. The panel is supposed to tackle tax abuses but Heaton was freely giving tips for dodging taxes. Heaton is a partner in accountancy firm Baker Tilly and is also a recent chair of the Tax Faculty at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Baker Tilly is no stranger to tax controversies as the firm's revenues are dependent on novel interpretations of tax laws. In January 2011, the UK government raised VAT from 17.5% to 20% and the firm urged companies to do their billing in advance and thus avoid the hike. In recent years, Baker Tilly has expanded its revenue-earning capacity by absorbing organisations chastised for designing aggressive tax-avoidance schemes.

The Gaar legislation came into effect on 1 July 2013 and is part of a trend of giving business a key role in law enforcement. Originally, it was intended to enable HMRC to challenge "aggressive" tax avoidance, but was soon diluted to focus only on the most abusive forms of tax avoidance. The flaws were noted by Lord MacGregor, chair of the House of Lords economic affairs sub-committee on the finance bill, who said that: "There is a misconception that Gaar will mean the likes of Starbucks and Amazon will be slapped with massive tax bills. This is wrong and the government needs to explain that to the public. Gaar is narrowly defined and will only impact on the most abusive of tax avoidance".

The Gaar legislation contains a "double reasonableness" test and requires HMRC to show that the tax avoidance schemes under scrutiny "cannot [reasonably] be regarded as a reasonable course of action". An avoidance scheme will be treated as abusive only if it would not be reasonable to hold such a view. So, if a dubious practice is widespread and established then it may well be considered to be reasonable.

HMRC is further shackled in that it can't easily go to the courts to enforce Gaar because it needs permission from a panel of experts on whether the arrangements in question constitute a reasonable course of action. The panel members are unpaid and this inevitably favours businesses that can bear the cost of seconding staff. In addition to Heaton, other members of the panel are Patrick Mears (chair), a senior tax partner at law firm Allen and Overy; Michael Hardwick, a consultant at law firm Linklaters; Brian Jackson, vice-president for group tax at Burberry group plc and previously tax partner at KPMG; Sue Laing, a partner at law firm Boodle Hatfield; Gary Shiels, a business consultant; and Bob Wheatcroft, a partner in accountancy firm Armstrong Watson.

There is no representation from NGOs and others who routinely expose tax avoidance. If matters reach a court, then judges need to take into account the opinion of the Gaar advisory panel given to the HMRC. The legislation says little about the public accountability of the panel.

George Osborne courted public opinion by saying that he found tax avoidance/evasion "morally repugnant", but the government's sense of morality is to appoint foxes to guard the henhouse. No doubt, members of the Gaar panel are devoted to serving the public interest, but their conception of the public interest is likely to be informed by their business and professional interests, especially as their profits and bonuses are dependent on serving clients. So who is safeguarding the interests of the ordinary people?

Neoliberals would defend the current arrangements by arguing that government needs people who know the practices and are thus best suited to be the guards. If that logic had any substance then those falling on hard times or suffering because of the bedroom tax should be deciding who can reasonably be prosecuted for, say, benefit fraud. But that is not the case. The government has mobilised the full might of the state to tackle benefit fraud estimated to be around £1.9bn a year, but the same does not apply to tax avoidance/evasion running at between £35bn and £100bn a year.

This article first appeared on Comment is Free

MG Rover debacle can’t hide accounting regulation failures

Prem Sikka

The UK accountancy watchdog has barked. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has fined Deloitte & Touche £14 million for failures relating to the demise of MG Rover. The report says Deloitte was engaged in huge conflicts of interest as the firm acted both as auditor and advisor to the company and its directors.

The MG Rover debacle began in 2000 when four businessmen (subsequently known as the Phoenix Four) bought the ailing carmaker from BMW for just £10. The purchase was accompanied by a loan of £423 million from BMW and the UK government also provided additional funds. Deloitte acted as auditor of MG Rover and an adviser to the Phoenix Four. The company continued to receive a clean bill of health from auditors. Between 2000 and 2005, the Phoenix Four collected around £42 million in remuneration. With advice from Deloitte some £7.7 million ended up in an offshore trust in Guernsey. In 2005, the company collapsed with debts of nearly £1.4 billion. Some 6,000 workers lost their jobs.

Following a public outcry, the Department of Business Innovation and Skills appointed inspectors, one of whom was an accountant, to investigate the debacle. The two volume report (here and here ) cost £16 million and was published in 2009. The report noted that between 2000 and 2005, Deloitte received £30.7m in fees, of which £28.8m related to consultancy, that is, only £1.9 related to audits.

Deloitte was advising the company and its directors and then audited the resulting transactions. Hence the concerns about possible conflicts of interest and the disciplinary tribunal’s conclusion that Deloitte “failed to be sufficiently objective in its work for MG Rover”. Deloitte is found guilty of “misconduct” and the FRC report states: “the acts which amount to misconduct were quite deliberate” and the firm and its lead partner “placed their own interest ahead of that of the public and compromised their own objectivity. This was a flagrant disregard of the professional standards.”

The FRC’s reputation as an accounting watchdog was severely battered by the banking crash. All distressed banks received a clean bill of health from their auditors even though depositors were queuing outside banks to withdraw their cash and governments were bailing out banks. The FRC failed to investigate any of the auditing firms. The MG Rover debacle has given it an opportunity to reinvent itself. The £14 million fine on Deloitte is the highest ever against any accounting firms. But all is not what it seems.

For any regulatory system to be effective regulators need to act swiftly. That has not been the case for the FRC. It initially announced its intention to investigate the conduct of Deloitte as auditor and adviser to the MG Rover Group in August 2005. The wheels of the profession grind slowly and then it claimed that will proceed after the inspectors’ reports if finalised, which was published in 2009. It has taken the FRC another four years to do anything. This is hardly a model of swift action.

The £14m fine may be the largest ever, but needs to be seen in perspective. It is less than half of the £30.7m fees collected by Deloitte. So despite failures and “misconduct”, the firm has still made considerable profit. The firm’s UK revenues are around £2.5 billion; that’s £6.85m a day. The fine amounts of the loss of about two days' revenue. This is unlikely to make accountancy firm partners quake in their boots.

The fine will fill the coffers of the FRC and will not be used to compensate creditors, employees, or taxpayers who provided social security and other benefits for the redundant workers.

The MG Rover episode does not herald a new dawn in the regulation of auditors. Despite the toxic effects of conflicts of interest and calls from parliamentary committees, the FRC has resisted a total ban on auditors acting as consultants for companies. So companies will continue to audit the transactions they themselves have overseen. Some of the darker practices could be flushed out and given public visibility by compulsory tendering of audits, but the FRC opposes that too.

For the time being, the MG Rover episode may legitimise the FRC’s regulatory credentials but the fault lines are as big as ever and will not go away.

• This article first appeared on The Conversation website

The race is on, but the field is limited in the auditing business

Prem Sikka

Isn’t it interesting how governments go through the rituals of promoting competition, but little actually changes? The latest example is the UK Competition Commission’s report on the UK auditing industry.
The report is supposedly concerned with enhancing competition in the UK auditing market. The current position is dire. Thanks to the close alignment between corporate interests, policymakers and politicians, successive governments permitted restrained mergers.

Today the auditing market is dominated by just four accounting firms. These are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche and KPMG (known as the Big Four firms), and between them they audit 99 of the UK’s biggest listed companies (FTSE100) and around 240 of the next 250. On average, a FTSE100 auditor remains in office for about 48 years; for the FTSE250 the average is 36 years. The Big Four firms are dominant in most western countries. Their global income from auditing and consultancy services is about £77 billion (US$115 billion) and some £7.9 billion ($11.9bn) of it comes from the UK. This provides plenty of financial and political resources to thwart any unwelcome policies.

The probability of another accounting firm breaking into this magic circle is extremely low as the entry costs are high. The challengers need help but there is little on the table from the Competition Commission. The Commission does not want to break-up the Big Four firms or place any limits on the proportion of market they can dominate. It does not want to place any time limits on the audit firm’s tenure either.

This monopoly of company audits has been the springboard for the growth of the Big Four accounting firms. Audits give accounting firms easy access to company boards and lets the accountants sell all kind of additional services, ranging from tax avoidance, advice on mergers and takeovers to printing T-shirts, badges and laying golf courses. All this increases fee dependency on clients and must lessen the probability of speaking out against unsavoury practices. At the dawn of the banking crash, concerned savers were forming queues outside distressed banks and governments were bailing out banks, but auditors gave their customary clean bill of health to all distressed banks. This silence was not followed by any investigation by the UK government. There is no action by any regulator either. Even if they act, it takes years. The matters relating to the audit of automaker MG Rover by Deloitte were referred to the Financial Reporting Council, the UK regulator, in 2005. It finally reported on 29 July 2013.

The regulatory inertia neither encourages competition nor improves the quality of audits. Last year, a tax tribunal heard a case relating to a tax avoidance scheme designed by Ernst & Young for Iliffe News and Media. The company was very profitable, but was concerned that healthy profits would encourage employees to demand higher wages. So Ernst & Young, who were also the company’s auditors, designed a scheme that would artificially depress profits and avoid tax too. The company’s board minutes stated that Ernst & Young confirmed that the use of the scheme would also “significantly lessen the transparency of reported results”. Despite such episodes, the Competition Commission does not want to ban the sale of consultancy by auditors to their audit clients. The best that it can come-up with is that companies might put audits out of tender every five years.

The Competition Commission could have increased the market pressures on auditors to improve quality of audits by empowering consumers of audit opinions, but it does not do that. Auditors only owe a “duty of care” to the company rather than to any individual shareholder, creditor or any other stakeholder. So individuals can do little to bring negligent auditors to book. Court cases such as MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG & Anor v Freightliner Ltd & Anor [2007] show that there is little recourse against auditors even when they are found to be negligent.

At annual general meetings (AGMs) shareholders are asked to vote on auditor appointment and remuneration, but this resolution is not supported by any information about quality of audit work, lawsuits or regulatory action against auditors. Shareholders are not given any sight of auditor working papers. Shareholders have no idea of the work done by auditors. Auditing firms are commercial concerns and their success is measured by profits. In pursuit of profits, the firms reduce the time allocated to each audit even though audits are labour intensive and need a higher time budget. The hope is that aspiring accountants will work evenings and week-ends for free. Academic research shows that a large number of audit staff do not go along with such strategies and resort to falsification of audit work or ignore awkward transactions because they require more time than is allocated. Audit failures are manufactured by the business model and organisation culture of accountancy firms, but this does not even appear on the radar of the Competition Commission.

There is little meaningful public information about auditors. There is no public availability of audit contract, information composition of the audit team, time spent on the job, details of meetings with company directors, or anything else that might enable the consumers of audit opinions to assess audit quality.

The Competition Commission has capitulated to the lobbying power of the Big Four and failed to introduce any meaningful reforms. Maybe such issues will be considered after the next banking crash.


This article first appeared on The Conversation website

Prince Charles must go public with tax dealings

Prem Sikka

The UK House of Commons Public Accounts Committee is examining some of the financial affairs of Prince Charles, heir to the British throne. The Committee should be concerned that the Duchy of Cornwall, Prince’s business arm, is exempt from corporation and capital gains tax. This means that the Duchy does not make any financial contribution towards the social infrastructure used by it. Its tax exemptions also give it unfair advantage over its rivals.

The Duchy of Cornwall is the remnant of a bygone feudal age. The Duchy’s estate was created in 1337 by Edward III for his son and heir, Prince Edward. It provides income for the Duke of Cornwall, always the male heir to the throne. Today, the Duchy’s estate is no longer confined to land in Cornwall. It is a sprawling conglomerate, the third largest landowner in the UK, owning 53,154 hectares of land in 24 counties, mostly in the South West of England.

The Duchy’s 2013 balance sheet shows net assets of £762 million though the market value is likely to be several billions. Its portfolio of assets includes 3,500 individual lettings, including 700 agricultural agreements, 700 residential agreements, and 1,000 commercial agreements. The Duchy owns Dartmoor Prison, the Oval cricket ground in London, a Waitrose warehouse in Milton Keynes, pubs, shops, hotels and building occupied by King’s College London. The Duchy also jointly owns a biomethane injection plant.

The Duchy directly competes with commercial organisations to trade in property, house building, holiday rentals, organic food, jam, marmalades and biscuits. Its profits are boosted by the direct use of social infrastructure funded by taxpayers in the shape of local/central government, transport, security, legal system, and education and healthcare provided to its employees. But the Duchy makes no direct financial contribution towards any of this because it is exempt from the UK corporation and capital gains tax.

The tax privileges of the Duchy are often defended by claims that it is a private estate (is the monarchy private?), or that it is a private trust for the benefit of the Duke of Cornwall, or that somehow the Duchy and the Duke merge into one.

An ongoing freedom of information case has lifted some of the legal murk surrounding the Duchy to reveal its economic substance: it is a legal person in its own right. The evidence provided by Prince Charles’s representatives showed that the Duchy enters into legal contracts in its own name. Its staff are employed by the Duchy rather than the Duke. The Duchy has sued and has been sued in its own name. It is registered for VAT and Pay As You Earn (PAYE). Employees give their consent to the Duchy to process their personal data. The Duchy is notified as the Data Controller under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Duchy has bank accounts in its own name. There have been transactions between the Duchy and Duke, clearly acknowledging that the two are separate.

Parliament has no say in how the profits are to be distributed. The Duchy’s entire income goes to Prince Charles. Between 2008 and 2013, UK workers saw a real terms cut of 6% in their pay. By contrast, Prince Charles’s income rose from to £18.7 million to £20.2 million for the same period. A large part of this came from the Duchy of Cornwall, whose contribution increased from £16.27 million in 2008 to £19.05 million in 2013.
The Duchy of Cornwall’s website states:

As The Prince already pays income tax on the Duchy’s surplus, the Duchy does not pay Corporation Tax. If the Duchy also paid Corporation Tax, The Prince would effectively be taxed twice on the same income. Only companies pay Corporation Tax; many other large organisations which are not companies pay income tax.

Inevitably, the Prince is seeking to endear himself to the people by claiming that he pays income tax, just like anyone else. But how much income tax does he pay? Page 27 of the Prince’s 2013 annual review states:

The Prince of Wales pays income tax voluntarily on the surplus of the Duchy of Cornwall, applying normal income tax rules and at the 50 per cent rate, and pays income tax on all other income and capital gains tax like any private individual. The £4.426 million includes VAT.

It is worth noting that income tax and VAT payments, which are payable by all consumers, have been lumped together to produce a higher amount. Why this obfuscation by combining direct and indirect taxes?

Any comparison of the Prince’s direct (income tax) and indirect (VAT) tax contribution with that of an ordinary citizen is difficult, but statistics provide some food for thought. The most recent government statistics show that for 2011/12, direct and indirect taxes added up to 36.6% of the income of the bottom 20% of the UK households, and averaged at 34.6% of the income of all households. The £4.426 million tax payment by the Prince amounts to 23.2% of his income.

The controversies about Prince Charles’s business dealings are unlikely to go away. The feudal arrangements do not sit easily with contemporary notions of democracy and public accountability. Insetad, we must subject all payments to any part of the monarchy to parliamentary approval and scrutiny.

This article first appeared on The Conversation website

G8 summit: High on vague promises, low on delivery

Prem Sikka

The G8 summit in Lough Erne was preceded by much hype and promises  about action on tax avoidance and corporate secrecy, but it has  delivered little. The leaders' communiqué commits governments to nothing more than vague promises.

The most welcome development is that the ten-point communiqué  endorses automatic exchange of information in matters relating to tax evasion, assuming that something is always classified as “tax evasion”  rather than its greyer cousin “tax avoidance”. Thus if a resident of the UK has stashed cash in a tax haven, then that jurisdiction would be obliged to inform the UK tax authorities.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published its proposals,  but the G8 has made no mention of any time scale for implementation. Neither does the communiqué say anything about how this information exchange is to be co-ordinated or enforced.

More importantly, how the UK is going to persuade its secretive Crown Dependencies to sign the exchange? How will places such as the Cayman Islands comply with this protocol when they do not levy income or corporate taxes, and thus do not have the infrastructure for collecting  data about taxes or tax avoidance vehicles?

The promise to reveal beneficial ownership of companies looks  attractive, as anonymous companies facilitate tax avoidance/evasion, money laundering and flight of capital. The communiqué states that this

"could be achieved through central registries of company beneficial ownership and basic information at national or state level. Countries should consider measures to facilitate access to company  beneficial ownership information by financial institutions and other regulated businesses. Some basic company information should be publicly accessible."

A number of things are noticeable. There is no intention to let the public know the details about ownership of companies. There is no mention of any timescale within which any reforms are to be implemented.  Maybe this absence of detail is indicative of oppositions that some  governments are likely to encounter from their local economic elites.

The US has a particular problem in that its own tax havens Delaware, Nevada and New Jersey need to be persuaded to embrace openness, something they have so far resisted. The UK will also have to do much to  get anywhere near the promise. At present foreign companies, including  those registered in secretive tax havens, can be directors of the companies registered in the UK. Shares in UK companies can be held by nominees, who may not be resident in the UK. Yet there is no commitment to introduce any legislation. The  failure of the UK to lead by example may also embolden the UK Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to resist some of the changes.

Trusts are a key vehicle for providing secrecy and avoiding taxes. The communiqué advocates more information about them too, but not for the general public. It says that the information about them should be  accessible by law enforcement, tax administrations and other relevant authorities including, as appropriate, financial intelligence units. So the public bears the cost of tax avoidance perpetrated through trusts but will not be permitted to know the beneficiaries. Again, there is no  mention of any time scale. Once again, the UK will have much to do because there is no public record of the number of trusts, or their beneficiaries.

With tax revenues, developing countries can lift their population out of poverty. So it is welcome to note that the communiqué states that “Developing countries should have the information and capacity to collect the taxes owed them … Other countries have a duty to help them”. But, once again, there is no firm commitment to deliver any policy changes in the G8 countries.

With a daily diet of revelations about tax avoidance by giant corporations, such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Starbucks and eBay, there was a feeling that the G8 would start a dialogue about changing the system for taxing corporate profits. The communiqué states that “Countries should change rules that let companies shift their profits across borders to avoid taxes”, but change to what? There is no commitment and no foundations have been laid for taking the matters forwards at the next G20 or the G8 meeting even though alternative models exist.

The kindest thing that one could say about the G8 communiqué is that as a result of public anger, issues such as tax avoidance and corporate secrecy are on the political agenda. However, the summit has not delivered.

Perhaps, the expectations were too high. After all, most G8 leaders are facing declining popularity at home. The UK Prime Minister is facing dissent within the Conservative Party, the policy disagreements with  coalition partners Liberal Democrats are becoming more vocal (e.g. over benefit and tax cuts), and his popularity ratings are down. Similarly,  with intransigence by the Republican Party US President Obama can’t push through his preferred policies through the legislature. So they all  need some trophies to take home, which look and sound good but will not commit them to any firm legislative action.

Another thought is that with no representations from Africa, India, China and Brazil, the G8’s terms for ending tax avoidance or corporate secrecy may not be acceptable to the emerging economic powerhouses. So the action will move to next year’s G20 summit. As always, corporate elites will be operating behind the scenes and colonising the political  agenda. Any progress on eroding secrecy and tax avoidance is going to be slow, and that is a good reason for civil society to continue to campaign for change.

This article first appeared on The Conversation website

Country-by-country reporting is a victory for citizens over companies

Prem Sikka

The Twitter age is about to chalk up its first success in the grey world of corporate accounting. It has been reported that the European Union will seek to make large companies disclose the taxes they pay and profits they make on a country-by-country basis.

This is part of the crackdown on corporations avoiding their obligations. The concerns are driven by tax avoidance, as companies have sales, employees and assets in one place, but end up booking them in jurisdictions with comparatively few employees, sales and assets. The idea behind country by country (CbC) reporting is to enable citizens to scrutinise corporate practices and ask critical questions.

The EU proposals mark the beginning, but CbC is a much broader idea. It supplements the traditional model of publishing profit and loss account, balance sheet and a cash flow statement. These statements relate to the company as a single economic entity and do not provide any disaggregated information. So these statements do not reveal the taxes a company may have paid in each country, or the profits and losses made there.

The traditional approach in accounting circles has been to require companies to publish “segmental reports”, in which company directors offer a commentary on major operating segments, products and services, the geographical areas in which they operate and their major customers. Such reports are too general and do not focus on each country.

In contrast, CbC requires companies to publish a table showing sales, costs, profits, losses, taxes, loans, subsidies and employees for each country of its operations. It could even be used to demand information about carbon emissions and other corporate footprints in each country. Such a table would show that a location has relatively few employees but is reporting very high profits, or that a country has a high proportion of a company’s sales and employees, but pays little or no tax. Armed with this information, citizens may be able to construct shadow accounts and question conventional accounts offered by corporations – the ones that say, “we are good citizens, we pay taxes and really care for the community”.

CbC is the culmination of a decade-long campaign by civil society organisations. When fully enacted, it will be the first accounting standard formulated and developed by civil society rather than the traditional accounting standard setters. It represents the first time activists have demanded and secured an accounting standard that the establishment was not keen on in the social media age.


In 2003, in my capacity as director of the Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs (AABA), I encouraged Richard Murphy, a chartered accountant, to draft a proposal that could highlight flight of capital, profits and the mismatch between profits, employees, assets and tax.

The first draft was published in 2003 and has continued to be refined. Initially, meetings were sought with the more traditional accounting standard setters, such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), but they showed no interest.

There was considerable opposition from the professional accountancy bodies. For example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales was vehemently opposed to it. Major accounting firms and corporations were also opposed to CbC.

For example, Deloitte said “we do not believe that imposing incremental country by country disclosure in financial statements prepared under IFRSs is warranted”. A survey in 2010 did not show much enthusiasm for CbC among FTSE 100 directors. The usual arguments were that disclosure would be costly, even though companies should already have the information about the performance of their subsidiaries in each country of their operation. The cost of publishing this internally held information is negligible.

The main turning point was the support given by NGOs, such as Christian-Aid, Publish What You Pay (PWYP), War on Want, Tax Justice Network, Oxfam and many others, not only in the UK and the EU, but also in developing countries and the US. The credit for this must go to Richard Murphy. This campaign was joined by some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and also Labour MPs.

Much to the dismay of the accounting establishment, their pressure persuaded the EU to launch a consultation exercise in 2010 and has now resulted in partial implementation of CbC. No doubt, there is more to come.

The story of the country by country reporting is that in the digital era, it may well be possible to mobilise alternative centres of power, at least in crafting new accounting disclosure rules. This announcement has been a victory for those of us who campaign for greater transparency on tax. Let’s hope it’s the first of many.

Prem Sikka is senior adviser to Tax Justice Network.

This article first appeared on The Conversation website

We are light years away from the days of Cadbury capitalism

Prem Sikka

The tax debate offers insight into the possible trajectories of capitalism.

Organised tax avoidance does not create anything of social value, but encourages concentration of wealth in relatively few hands. It is part of the unsustainable technique for increasing short-term profits. Companies have become adept at increasing profits through imposition of wage freezes of workers and dilution of their pension rights. This has been supplemented through management of how and where taxes are paid.

Public attention is now focused not only on the tax practices of multinational corporations, such as Google and Amazon, but also on traditional retailers such as Marks and Spencer. And then there is the tax industry. This is dominated by accountants, lawyers and finance experts. The role of the Big Four accountancy firms – KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte and Ernst & Young – in designing, marketing and implementing complex tax operations has been scrutinised by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

Anyone looking at the websites of accountancy firms will see claims of ethics, integrity, and a burning desire to serve the public interest and uphold the law. Yet, following a briefing from a former PwC insider the PAC chairperson said (see page Ev4) that the firm “will approve a tax product if there is a 25% chance – a one-in-four chance – of it being upheld. That means that you are offering schemes to your clients where you have judged there is a 75% risk of it then being deemed unlawful”.

The PwC partner at the committee’s hearing denied this. Partners from other firms claimed their thresholds were 50%. By their own admission the firms are selling tax avoidance schemes with the knowledge that there is a 50% chance that their practices will be found to be unlawful. The firms know that in the age of austerity the tax authorities will never have sufficient resources to challenge them. So they continue, with the sole aim of producing private profits.

We are light years away from the capitalism of Cadbury and Quaker, which had some social conscience. Highly organised tax avoidance is the outcome of the relentless promotion of enterprise culture and deregulation over the last 35 years. It has persuaded many to believe that ‘bending the rules’ for personal gain is a sign of business acumen. Any ‘deal’, regardless of the social consequences is considered to be acceptable as long as it produces private profits, especially where competitive pressures link promotion, prestige, status and reward, markets, niches with meeting business targets. Those able to sail close to the wind are seen as financial wizards, media stars and are much in demand. The shame no longer resides in participation in activities that undermine social fabric, or even in being caught. Fines and sentences have just become another business cost.

In March 2013, Ernst & Young paid a fine of $123 million to the US tax authorities to resolve allegations of tax fraud. The firm admitted wrongful conduct by certain partners and employees. A number of its former personnel have received prison sentences. Previously, KPMG paid a fine of $456 million after admitting “criminal wrongdoing” over the sale of avoidance schemes and a number of its former personnel also received prison sentences. Despite massive reductions in the rate of corporation tax and top rates of personal income tax, the tax avoidance industry shows no sign of abating.

A large number of tax avoidance schemes have been declared illegal by the UK courts. The UK Ministers have referred to the schemes marketed by the big accountancy firms as “blatantly abusive avoidance scams”, but this has not been followed up with any investigation, inquiry, prosecutions or fines. No accountancy firm has ever been fined or disciplined by its professional body for selling unlawful tax avoidance schemes. In fact, there are no negative consequences for the designers of such schemes.

The big firms, HMRC, the Treasury and senior civil servants and politicians (see chapter five for evidence) maintain a close relationship. The firms provide jobs for some former and potential ministers. They donate money and services to political parties/former partners now hold senior positions at HMRC and the Treasury.

Democracy is a major casualty of a rampant tax avoidance industry. We can all be persuaded to vote for a political party that promises investment in education, healthcare, pensions, security and transport, but the ultimate veto rests with the tax avoidance industry and its clients. They can scupper any chances of public investment by designing schemes that erode tax revenues. The result? The loss of hard won social rights and inability of governments to deliver on their promises.

• This article first appeared on The Conversation website

Mervyn King’s rosy recovery prediction means little for a shattered nation

Prem Sikka

The outgoing Bank of England governor Mervyn King has presided over a huge economic crisis. His parting gift is the claim “a recovery is in sight” that the UK might achieve economic growth of even 1% this year. Despite this, the GDP will still be less than the 2007 figure.

Don’t be in a hurry to pop any champagne corks, because the assumed economic recovery is not what it seems and is unlikely to be sustained. It has been achieved through quantitative easing, printing money as old-fashioned economists used to call it, to the tune of £375 billion. That is equivalent to about £16,000 per household.

This money has been added to national debt – the only thing that citizens seem to own these days – but has not been used to restructure the UK economy or start new industries. Instead, it has been mainly given to the banks and they have used it to bolster their balance sheets and pay high executive salaries.

The plight of ordinary people has been getting worse. UK unemployment is rising and the official count now stands at 2.52 million. Nearly a million young people aged 16-24 are unemployed, taking the rate to a depressing 21.2%. The number of young people on zero hour contracts has doubled from 35,000 in 2008 to 76,000 in 2012. Zero contract hours are jobs which provide no guarantee of regular work or pay and have become the preferred mode of employment for some 23% of UK employers. Many miss out on rights such as sick pay, pension and paid holidays. Many firms and even charities and public sector organisations are adopting zero hour contracts.

Large sections of the UK population are wracked with insecurity. Since the 1980s, the governments have sought to weaken and destroy trade unions. In 1979, some 13.2 million UK workers, or 55.4% of the workforce was in a trade union, but by 2011 this declined to just over 6 million workers or 23% of the work force, compared to 69.2% in Finland, 68.4% in Sweden, 66.6% in Denmark and 54.4% in Norway.

In the absence of countervailing power structures, workers' pay has been ruthlessly assaulted. In 1976, wages and salaries paid to employees, expressed as percentage of GDP, stood at 65.1% of GDP. Now it stands at barely 53%. The plight of ordinary people is made even worse because the above statistics include the rewards lapped up by executives. The rates of corporate profitability are at historically high.

Wealth has been sucked upwards with the aid of state policies. Corporation tax rate has been reduced from 52% in 1982 to 21% for 2014. The top marginal rate of income tax has declined from 83%, in 1979, to 45%. Despite the recession, the rich are getting richer. In 2012, the richest 1000 people, representing just 0.003% of the adult population, increased their wealth by £35 billion to £450 billion, enabling them to fund political parties and shape public choices.

It is misery for ordinary people who have borrowed £1.423 trillion, equivalent to the GDP, to maintain a decent living standard. Thousands of people have become victims of the payday loans industry which does not shy away from charging interest at the rate of 4000%. Some 13.5 million people, including 1.8 million pensioners and 2.5 million children were estimated to be living below the poverty line and with a deep austerity programme these numbers will increase.

The number of people relying on emergency food handouts, simply to survive, has trebled to 350,000. People are facing massive hikes in the price of electricity, gas, water, transport and other essentials and simply do not have the financial capacity to take any further hits. One survey has suggested that an increase in monthly bills of just £99 will prove to be disastrous for a large number of families.

The above sketch of the social landscape is a million miles away from the rosy picture painted by the Bank of England. Equitable distribution of income and wealth is a key requirement for any sustained economic recovery, but it is not on the agenda of any major political party. Some may be happy to gather the crumbs of economic recovery; but most of us will simply be asking, “what recovery?”

• This article first appeared at The Conversation